

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 BAMAKO 03662 01 OF 02 010857Z
ACTION AF-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 NEA-10 ISO-00 IO-13 CIAE-00 DODE-00
PM-05 H-01 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01
SP-02 SS-15 ICA-11 AID-05 OMB-01 TRSE-00 EB-08
HA-05 AGRE-00 COME-00 ACDA-12 MCE-00 /130 W
-----030445 010912Z/15

R 010001Z AUG 78

FM AMEMBASSY BAMAKO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0221
INFO AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY RABAT
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
AMEMBASSY ALGIERS
AMEMBASSY DAKAR
AMEMBASSY OUAGADOUGOU
AMEMBASSY NIAMEY

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 1 OF 2 BAMAKO 3662

E. O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MINI
SUBJECT: ASSISTANT SECRETARY MOOSE MEETING WITH SECGEN FOREIGN
AFFAIRS

1. ON JULY 31, 1978, ASSISTANT SECRETARY MOOSE HAD A ONE-HOUR MEETING WITH MALIAN SECRETARY GENERAL OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS SEYDOU TRAORE, WHO WAS ACCCOMPANIED BY OUSMANE DIALLO, DIRECTOR GENERAL OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND ALIOU KEITA OF THE POLITICAL DIVISION. MOOSE WAS ACCOMPANIED BY AMBASSADOR BYRNE AND AF/W DIRECTOR SMITH.

2. TRAORE BEGAN BY WELCOMING MOOSE AND SAYING THAT ALTHOUGH MISS LILLIAN HAD ARRIVED AT THE LUSHEST TIME OF YEAR, THIS GREENNESS IS AS EVANESCENT AS A DESERT MIRAGE.
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 BAMAKO 03662 01 OF 02 010857Z

HOWEVER, HE SAID, WE HAVE HAD REASONABLY GOOD RAINS AND HOPE FOR A NORMAL HARVEST.

3. MOOSE REPLIED BY EMPHASIZING OUR APPRECIATION FOR ALL THAT THE MALIAN GOVERNMENT HAD DONE TO ARRANGE MISS LILLIAN'S VISIT. HE SAID MISS LILLIAN HAD COME TO SEE THE PROBLEMS OF THE SAHEL AT FIRSTHAND AND TO GAIN IMPRES-

SIONS OF THE SITUATION. HE NOTED THE IMPORTANCE OF MISS LILLIAN'S FOLLOW-ON APPEARANCES IN THE UNITED STATES, ON TELEVISION AND ELSEWHERE, TO CONTINUING SUPPORT FOR THE SAHEL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM. CONGRESS, IN PARTICULAR, IS INCREASINGLY SKEPTICAL ABOUT ALL FOREIGN AID.

4. TRAORE REPLIED THAT IT WAS ESSENTIAL TO MAINTAIN THE LEVEL OF U.S. ASSISTANCE AND, IF POSSIBLE, TO INCREASE ITS VOLUME. HE NOTED THE DIFFICULTIES OF EXPLAINING THE PROBLEMS OF A DEVELOPING COUNTRY TO ANYONE FROM A DEVELOPED ECONOMY. HE SAID THAT ALTHOUGH THE SAHEL IS POOR AND THINLY POPULATED, ITS DEVELOPMENT POTENTIAL IS ENORMOUS. TO REALIZE THIS POTENTIAL, HOWEVER, EQUALLY GREAT RESOURCES FROM DEVELOPED COUNTRIES WOULD BE REQUIRED. HE THOUGHT THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES WAS TWOFOLD: TO CONTINUE A HIGH LEVEL OF BILATERAL AID, AND TO BRING U.S. INFLUENCE TO BEAR ON POTENTIAL DONORS. MOOSE REPLIED THAT WE SEE THE PROBLEMS OF SAHEL DEVELOPMENT IN THE LARGEST POSSIBLE CONTEXT. EXCELLENT PLANNING BETWEEN DONORS AND DONOR RECIPIENTS WAS A POSITIVE FACTOR AND HAD STRENGTHENED CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT FOR THE PROGRAM.

5. INFRASTRUCTURE: TRAORE SAIS THAT ALTHOUGH IT WAS NECESSARY TO KEEP HUMANITARIAN CONSIDERATIONS TO THE FORE IN THE CONGRESS, IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO SEPARATE THE NEED OF INFRASTRUCTURE FROM THE DESIRE TO MEET HUMANITARIAN

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 BAMAKO 03662 01 OF 02 010857Z

GOALS. HE CITED, AS AN EXAMPLE, THE LIVESTOCK PROGRAM AND NOTED THE NECESSITY OF INVESTMENT IN INFRASTRUCTURE IN ORDER TO ENABLE MALI TO EXPORT THE PRODUCTS OF THE PROGRAM. MOOSE REPLIED THAT HE THOUGHT THE CONGRESS WAS BEGINNING TO UNDERSTAND THIS IMPORTANT POINT. HE BRIEFLY DESCRIBED THE HIGHLY SUCCESSFUL MEETINGS GAMBIAN PRESIDENT JAWARA HAD ON THE HILL, ESPECIALLY WITH SENATOR INOUYE, DURING HIS VISIT IN LATE MAY.

6. MALIAN MILITARY EXPENDITURES: MOOSE SAID THAT SPEAKING IN ALL FRANKNESS HE WISHED TO NOTE THE INTEREST OF THE CONGRESS IN THE SIZE OF MILITARY BUDGETS IN RECIPIENT COUNTRIES. HE ASKED TRAORE FOR AN EXPLANATION OF THE MALIAN CASE. TRAORE REPLIED THAT MALI PURCHASED EQUIPMENT FROM THE DEVELOPED COUNTRIES BECAUSE NO STATE HAD CONFIDENCE IN ITS NEIGHBORS AND BECAUSE NO COUNTRY COULD RELINQUISH RESPONSIBILITY FOR ITS OWN DEFENSE AND PUT ITSELF UNDER THE PROTECTION OF ANOTHER. WHEN MALI TOOK NOTE OF THE HUGE SUMS SPENT BY MANY COUNTRIES -- BUT PARTICULARLY BY DEVELOPED COUNTRIES FOR MILITARY EQUIPMENT -- WHEN MALI RECOGNIZED THAT THESE RESOURCES MIGHT BE BETTER SPENT IN FOREIGN ASSISTANCE, MALI FELT IT HAD NO

ALTERNATIVE BUT TO PREPARE TO DEFEND ITSELF. MOOSE THEN DREW ATTENTION TO THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN U.S. AND SOVIET ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN AFRICA AND TO THE FACT THAT SOVIET MILITARY EQUIPMENT SUPPLIED TO AFRICAN COUNTRIES FAR OUTWEIGHS THE VALUE OF ITS ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE. HE SUGGESTED THAT, FOR REASONS TRAORE HAD STATED, THE OAU SHOULD DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO REGULATE AND REDUCE ARMS TRANSFERS TO AFRICA. HE PROMISED U.S. SUPPORT FOR THIS EFFORT. MOOSE ADDED THAT THE U.S. AND THE SOVIET UNION WERE DISCUSSING MUTUAL RESTRAINT IN CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFERS. RESULTS WERE NOT EXPECTED IMMEDIATELY BUT THE EFFORT WAS BEING MADE. TRAORE SAID HE FULLY ACCEPTED MOOSE'S POINTS, BUT THAT THE PROBLEM WAS NOT SO SIMPLE. FOR INSTANCE, IF SOME DEVELOPED

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 BAMAKO 03662 01 OF 02 010857Z

COUNTRIES DECIDED NOT TO SEND ARMS TO AFRICA, A "BLACK" MARKET WOULD QUICKLY ARISE AND THE EFFECT OF SUCH A LAUDABLE DECISION ON SOME COUNTRIES' PART WOULD BE NULLIFIED.

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 BAMAKO 03662 02 OF 02 010905Z
ACTION AF-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 NEA-10 ISO-00 IO-13 CIAE-00 DODE-00
PM-05 H-01 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01
SP-02 SS-15 ICA-11 AID-05 OMB-01 TRSE-00 EB-08
HA-05 AGRE-00 COME-00 ACDA-12 MCE-00 /130 W
-----030502 010912Z/15

R 010001Z AUG 78
FM AMEMBASSY BAMAKO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0222
INFO AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY RABAT
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
AMEMBASSY ALGIERS
AMEMBASSY DAKAR
AMEMBASSY OUAGADOUGOU
AMEMBASSY NIAMEY

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 2 OF 2 BAMAKO 3662

7. WESTERN SAHARA: TURNING TO THE WESTERN SAHARA, TRAORE SAID THAT MALI WAS OPPOSED TO THE USE OF FORCE, SOUGHT A SUB-REGIONAL SOLUTION, AND THOUGHT THAT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, NOT WAR, SHOULD BE EVERY GOVERNMENT'S FIRST PRIORITY. MALI HAD BEEN OPPOSED FROM THE BEGINNING TO THE DISMEMBERMENT OF THE SAHARA. MALI FAVORED SELF-DETERMINATION. MALI RECOGNIZED THE COMPLEXITY OF THE PROBLEM, HOWEVER, AND FOR THIS REASON AT KHARTOUM HAD INSISTED ON THE NECESSITY OF CONSIDERABLE PREPARATION FOR A SUMMIT ON THE SAHARA, BEGINNING WITH AN AGREED STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND AN EXPLORATION OF POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS BY THE FIVE-MAN AD HOC COMMITTEE. TRAORE SAID HE THOUGHT THIS APPROACH COULD CONCEIVABLY RESULT IN A DOCUMENT FOR THE CONSIDERATION OF THE CHIEFS OF STATE THAT WOULD LEAD TO A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 BAMAKO 03662 02 OF 02 010905Z

8. CHAD: TRAORE SAID THE MALIAN GOVERNMENT REGARDS THE CHADIAN SITUATION AS AN INTERNAL PROBLEM IN THE TRUE SENSE. CHAD WAS DIVIDED BY HITHERTO APPARENTLY IRRECONCILABLE FACTIONS. HE THOUGHT THAT NO SOLUTION DEVISED FROM THE OUTSIDE THAT DID NOT TAKE ACCOUNT OF INTERNAL CHADIAN REALITIES COULD SUCCEED. TRAORE SAID HE THOUGHT CHAD COULD GET SUPPORT IN AFRICA FOR OPPOSITION TO LIBYAN INTERVENTION BUT BY ITSELF THAT WOULD NOT SOLVE THE INTERNAL PROBLEM. MALI ALSO RECOGNIZED CHAD'S RIGHT TO REQUEST FRENCH INTERVENTION, THOUGH IT DEPLORED THE ACTION.

9. THE MEETING CONCLUDED EARLIER THAN DESIRED BECAUSE OF THE PRESSURE OF OTHER EVENTS ON THE SCHEDULE. TRAORE SAID HASTILY, HOWEVER, THAT HE WISHED TO ADVISE THE UNITED STATES AGAINST PROVIDING ANY PRETEXT WHICH COULD LED TO INTERVENTION BY OTHER STATES IN AFRICA. HE THEN EXPRESSED HIS GOVERNMENT'S PLEASURE AT THE SUCCESSFUL SOLUTION FOUND BY THE FIVE-POWER GROUP IN NAMIBIA. MOOSE AGREED AND SAID HE WAS DELIGHTED BY THE WAY IN WHICH THE FIVE-POWER GROUP HAD MAINTAINED CONTACT WITH AND SECURED THE SUPPORT OF THE FRONT LINE STATES. MOOSE EXPRESSED GUARDED OPTIMISM REGARDING THE POSSIBILITY OF A SOLUTION TO RHODESIA'S PROBLEMS AND EMPHASIZED THE INTENTION OF THE UNITED STATES TO PRESS HARD, IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE BRITISH, FOR A PEACEFUL OUTCOME. TRAORE COMMENTED, JOKINGLY, THAT "IF YOU DO NOT SUCCEED, YOU MAY BE OBLIGED TO GO ALONG WITH OUR SOLUTIONS -- THAT IS, TO INVOKE CHAPTER SEVEN MEASURES."

BYRNE

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptoning: X
Capture Date: 01 jan 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: MEETINGS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 01 aug 1978
Decaption Date: 01 jan 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 20 Mar 2014
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1978BAMAKO03662
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: D780314-0305
Format: TEL
From: BAMAKO
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1978/newtext/t197808109/aaaadnwd.tel
Line Count: 224
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: c0a21759-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ACTION AF
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 5
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 22 apr 2005
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 1567642
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: ASSISTANT SECRETARY MOOSE MEETING WITH SECGEN FOREIGN AFFAIRS
TAGS: MILI, PINT, US, ML, (TRAORE, SEYDOU), (MOOSE, RICHARD)
To: STATE
Type: TE
vdkvgwkey: odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/c0a21759-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Sheryl P. Walter
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
20 Mar 2014
Markings: Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014